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Differentiation and diffusion: Shifting public opinion attitudes toward foreign policy in 
North Africa 
 
Lindsay J. Benstead (benstead@pdx.edu), Associate Professor of Political Science, Mark O. 
Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University, Portland, OR, United States 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on Arab Barometer data, this article provides the backdrop for understanding continuity 
and change since the Arab Spring in national-level public opinion attitudes toward economic and 
political foreign policy issues in North Africa, inclusive of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and 
Tunisia. The article leverages the concepts of differentiation and diffusion to understand how 
international affairs shape public opinion in North Africa since the Arab Spring. Three findings 
emerge. First, public opinion about domestic and international issues are linked in the minds of 
North African citizens and foreign policy issues are more important factors underlying pre- and 
post-Arab Spring politics than are often recognized. Especially in the post-Arab Spring era, Arab 
citizens widely see external interference as a problem and this perception increased in every 
North African country between 2013 and 2016. Moreover, there is considerable variation across 
and within North African states in attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues, 
including the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes about economic and security relationships with 
Israel. Anti-Israeli sentiment increased substantially in the years leading up to and following the 
Arab Spring. Finally, since the Arab Spring, anti-Americanism, as measured by negative 
perceptions of U.S. culture, has declined in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, but risen slightly in 
Egypt, even as North Africans demonstrate increased support for a U.S. role in resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict during this same time period. These trends suggest that anti-Americanism is 
highly dependent on specific domestic and international developments and is highly complex in 
the Arab world.  
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Introduction 
Authoritarian regimes in North Africa prior to the Arab Spring left citizens with limited power to 
hold their governments accountable. This was especially true of foreign policy. Under 
authoritarianism, foreign policy is traditionally the purview of the executive; other state and non-
state actors, including the citizenry, have limited ability to hold the executive accountable (Fish 
2006). Yet, the efforts of Arab governments to shape communication about foreign policy issues 
and the attempts of citizens to influence outside powers via protest and boycott movements 
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illustrate the degree to which Arab citizens are concerned about external issues affecting their 
region (Benstead and Reif 2017; Farah and Newman 2010). Citizens throughout North Africa 
hold diverse views regarding foreign policy issues that affect their country (e.g., Benstead and 
Boduszynski 2015). At times, the views of citizens run counter to longstanding government 
policies. But, in ways that are under-recognised, North African views have evolved during the 
last decade as well, with support for recognizing Israel declining across the region and anti-
Americanism diminishing on some measures as well. Exactly why views have shifted in some 
countries and not others, and how these changes relate to the Arab Spring, is not well 
understood. 
Yet, to varying degrees across North African countries, the Arab Spring opened up new 
avenues for citizens to contest foreign policy. Nowhere is this truer than in Tunisia, which 
transitioned to an electoral democracy following the ousting of President Zine al-Abidine Ben 
Ali in 2011; newfound freedoms opened up the potential for public mobilisation on foreign 
policy issues, whether overt foreign policy issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict or indirect 
political issues like the domestic political economy.1 Indeed, more than is reflected in the 
international media, the Arab Spring mobilisations were, at least in part, related to the pro-
Western and pro-Israeli policies of authoritarian Arab regimes. The role that regional and 
international issues played in shaping the Arab Spring, and how its aftermath will ultimately 
reshape the region’s foreign policy, is a new and crucial research area for students of 
international relations and comparative politics. 
Drawing on Arab Barometer data, this article provides the backdrop for understanding 
continuity and change since the Arab Spring in national-level public opinion attitudes toward 
economic and political foreign policy issues. I focus on all five North African countries, 
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inclusive of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. To understand the linkages between 
international and regional affairs and domestic public opinion, the article draws on the theoretical 
concepts of differentiation (the degree to which there is greater variation in public opinion across 
countries) and diffusion (the degree to which there is lesser variation in public opinion across 
countries) before and after the Arab Spring (Gourevitch 1978; Bush 2017).2  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After providing an overview of survey 
research in North Africa that deals with citizen attitudes toward foreign policy, I briefly explore 
three public opinion issues related to North African foreign policy: public perceptions of the 
Arab Spring and external interference in North Africa, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and 
perceptions of the West and especially the United States. A final section offers general 
conclusions. 
Citizen attitudes toward foreign policy in North Africa 
There is limited survey-based research on citizen attitudes toward foreign policy issues in North 
Africa (for exceptions, see Tessler and Warriner 1997; Zoubir and Aït-Hamadouche 2006; 
Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Benstead 
and Reif 2017). However, research using surveys of North African citizens is increasingly 
possible due to the rapid expansion of survey research in the Arab world, especially since the 
Arab Spring (see Table 1). Post-Arab Spring governments have allowed surveys to be conducted 
in several North African countries, including Tunisia and Libya, which were previously closed to 
survey researchers (Benstead 2017).3 As a result, there is a large body of publicly-available 
surveys from North Africa, including 10 datasets from the World Values Survey, 14 from the 




The Arab Barometer focuses most directly on international and regional affairs and offers 
the largest number of questions that are consistent from wave to wave and across countries on 
these topics (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012). In addition, survey 
research conducted by the Transitional Governance Project (TGP 2017),4 the Program on 
Governance and Local Development (GLD 2017),5 and other independent researchers has 
increased, most of which also focus on topics relevant to regional and international affairs (Bush 
and Jamal 2015; Bush and Prather 2017; Corstange and Marinov 2012). These data allow 
researchers to compare attitudes pre- and post-Arab Spring throughout North Africa, considering 
the fact that a total of six major surveys by these groups have been conducted in Libya, seven 
surveys have been conducted in Algeria and Morocco, and eight surveys have been conducted in 
Egypt and Tunisia. These data can help us better understand why international and regional 
developments shape public opinion of economic and political issues within and across countries. 
The Arab Barometer in particular includes an extensive number of questions over various 
years that permit an examination of the competing views and conceptions of some of the most 
salient foreign policy issues in North Africa. As of this writing, a total of four “waves” of 
surveys have been carried out in North Africa, including in 2006 (Wave 1), 2011 (Wave 2), 
2013-14 (Wave 3), and 2016 (Wave 4). By looking at data from 2006-2016, one can fully 
appreciate how public opinion forms the backdrop for understanding continuity and change in 
national-level foreign policy issues. In this regard, it is important to note that this article is not 
meant to be an exhaustive survey of the foreign policy content of all national surveys conducted 
in North Africa, nor is it even meant to be a systematic analysis of all foreign policy issues 
treated in the Arab Barometer. It instead provides a brief overview of three foreign issues 
captured in the Arab Barometer surveys, including public perceptions of the Arab Spring and 
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external interference in Africa, public perceptions of relations with Israel and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and public perceptions of the role of the West, especially the United States. These issues 
provide the public opinion backdrop for understanding the evolving foreign policy roles played 
by the state and non-state actors explored in the other contributions to this special issue. 
Public perceptions of the Arab Spring and external interference in North Africa 
According to the first wave of the Arab Barometer that was conducted in Algeria and Morocco 
shortly before the Arab Spring (2006-2008), North African citizens identified a range of 
domestic problems as the most important issues facing their countries (see Table 2). The most 
important problem stated by respondents was their country’s “economic situation,” inclusive of 
poverty, unemployment, and inflation, which was mentioned by 56 percent of respondents in 
Morocco and 51 percent of respondents in Algeria. This was followed by “corruption,” which 
was mentioned by 31 percent of respondents in Algeria and 27 percent of respondents in 
Morocco. Only 8 percent of Algerians and 4 percent of Moroccans mentioned “authoritarianism” 
as the most important problem confronting their country during the pre-Arab Spring.6 Very few 
citizens in Algeria and Morocco identified foreign policy issues as the most important challenges 
affecting their societies. As noted in Table 2, only 1 percent of Algerians and 1 percent of 
Moroccans cited “ending U.S. occupation in Iraq” as the most important challenge. Similarly, 
only 2 percent of Algerians and 2 percent of Moroccans cited the “Arab-Israeli conflict” as the 
most important challenge. In short, the Arab Spring was largely driven by perceptions of 
domestic as opposed to international issues. 
[Table 2] 
An emphasis on the overriding importance of the domestic dimension was reinforced by 
surveys carried out in Tunisia and Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, in which 
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few Tunisian and Egyptian citizens believed external issues played a role in causing the Arab 
Spring (see Table 3). When asked what they believed to be “the most important reason for the 
protests” that eventually toppled the Tunisian and Egyptian dictatorships, 54 percent of 
Egyptians and 63 percent of Tunisians cited “demands for improving the economic situation.” 
The second most important reason was “combatting corruption,” which was cited by 29 percent 
of Egyptians and 44 percent of Tunisians. In sharp contrast, less than 1 percent of Egyptians and 
Tunisians cited external issues, whether their country’s “pro-Western policies” or “pro-Israeli 
policies.”  
[Table 3] 
Rising and increasingly negative perceptions of foreign influence nonetheless increased 
in several North African countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (see Figure 1). When 
asked in 2013 whether “internal factors” or “external factors” were “more important in causing 
the lack of development in the Arab world,” significant but nonetheless variable numbers of 
North African citizens saw external factors as important, including 10 percent of Egyptians, 16 
percent of Moroccans, 20 percent of Libyans and Tunisians, and 25 percent of Algerians. The 
data also demonstrate an important pattern over time. Three countries witnessed an increase from 
2013 to 2016 in the number of citizens citing external factors as important (from 25 to 32 percent 
of Algerians, 20 to 35 percent of Tunisians, and 10 to 23 percent of Egyptians). Only in Morocco 
did this percentage decline, from 16 percent in 2013 to 13 percent in 2016. An Arab Barometer 
survey was not held in Libya in 2016. 
 [Figure 1] 
Negative North African perceptions of foreign influence were particularly salient in 
response to the question as to whether respondents agreed “to some or a great extent” that 
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“foreign interference” was “an obstacle to reform in your country” in the post-Arab Spring (see 
Figure 2). In 2016, those who agreed exceeded 70 percent in three North African countries: 
Algeria (76 percent), Tunisia (72 percent), and Egypt (72 percent). In the case of Libya, which 
was asked this question only in 2013 (a survey was not held in 2016), the percentage also 
exceeded 70 percent (77 percent were in agreement). Only in Morocco was this figure at a lower, 
but nonetheless relatively high level (49 percent in agreement). These results indicate strong 
North African public sentiment that their societies are less able to chart their own course against 
the tide of foreign interference. At the same time, however, the specific type of foreign 
interference (i.e., political or economic) or from where it emanates (i.e., the U.S., Europe, 
Russia, China, or the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia) is not specified in this question. 
[Figure 2] 
In sum, although North African citizens, like those throughout the world, focus first and 
foremost on their domestic environments as crucial to understanding their lot in life, including 
why the Arab spring occurred and what has unfolded in its aftermath, concluding on this basis 
that international issues are unimportant to North African citizens would be incorrect. Indeed, 
North African citizens are sophisticated in their views, with many perceiving foreign interference 
as a cause of the very economic and political problems at home that they say must be addressed. 
Public perceptions of relations with Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict 
North African nations vary widely in their relations with Israel. Historically, Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Egypt have pursued relatively open relations with Israel, while Algeria and Libya have been 
more staunchly anti-Israeli. Officially, Morocco does not recognize Israel, but has long 
encouraged Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The country has historically adhered to the Arab 
League’s boycott of Israel, which began in 1945 (Benstead and Reif 2017), though Morocco 
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began strengthening its economic ties with Israel in 1994 following the Oslo Accords. Morocco 
also strategically uses its support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process to argue that western 
countries should accept its policy in the Sahara (Abadi 2007; Segev and Shumacher 2006). 
However, more formal efforts to promote bilateral trade were cut in 2000 following the second 
intifada, which began in 2000 (Fernández-Molina 2016). 
Tunisia and Egypt have also had close foreign relations with Israel. Egypt established 
diplomatic relations with Israel following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which made 
Egypt a relative anomaly in the Middle East for its recognition of and diplomatic relations with 
Israel (Tessler 2009; Shama 2014). While it has never had official diplomatic relations with 
Israel, Tunisia became the first Arab country to host members of the Israeli leadership. Like 
Morocco, it cut trade relations with Israel in 2000 due to the outbreak of the second intifada. 
Unlike other countries in North Africa, however, Tunisia has had a more tangible relationship 
with the Palestinians, having hosted the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) leadership in 
Tunis from 1982 until the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 (Abadi 2017).  
Algeria and Libya have taken a more stringent approach toward Israel (Joffe and Paoletti 
2011; St John 2003, 2011). Opposition to Israel on the part of both the Algerian government, as 
well as its population, has always been strong. Algeria’s own troubled history with colonialism 
informs much of the public’s opposition to Israeli policy. Algeria fought a brutal revolutionary 
war against France from 1954 to 1962, and ever since has been a leader in the anti-colonial and 
non-aligned movement (Mortimer 2015). Libya too did not had diplomatic relations with Israel. 
Muammar Qaddafi frequently spoke out about Israeli colonialism and interference in Palestine 
and Africa, which he saw as sapping Arab unity and strength (St John 2011). Yet, in the regime’s 
final months, Saif al-Islam Qaddaffi unsuccessfully conducted back channel diplomacy with 
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Israel, via a Jewish Austrian friend and political party member, David Lazar, and an Israeli 
Druze member of the Knesset, Ayoob Kara, seeking to end NATO airstrikes against Libya in 
exchange for assistance securing the release of Gilad Shalit from HAMAS (Asharq Al-Awsat 
2011). On August 23, 2011, two months before the capture and death of Muammar Qaddafi, 
Ahmed Shabani, a member of the Libyan opposition, expressed support for a two-state solution 
in an attempt to build international support for the transitional regime in Libya (Melman 2011). 
Later that year, Israel voted in the United Nations General Assembly to recognize the National 
Transition Council as the representative of the Libyan people (United Nations 2011).  
When it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, North Africans overwhelmingly express 
solidarity with the Palestinians. Attitudes about the Arab-Israeli peace process and economic and 
security relationships with Israel have nonetheless shifted over time (see Figure 3). In general, 
Algerians hold the least conciliatory view toward Israel, while Egyptians hold the most 
conciliatory view. In 2011, for example, when North Africans were asked whether the “Arab 
world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East,” 35 percent of 
Egyptians (the most conciliatory) and 5 percent of Algerians (the least conciliatory) stated that 
they would accept Israel, but only if a two-state solution was reached. The views of Tunisians 
(18 percent) and Moroccans (24 percent) were between these extremes (and Libyans were not 
surveyed in 2011). 
[Figure 3] 
Support for recognising Israel, even if a two-state solution with the Palestinians is 
reached, has declined throughout North Africa over the last decade, except in the case of Algeria, 
which witnessed a slight increase from 5 percent in 2011 to 11 percent in 2013. This diffusion 
effect can likely be attributed to deteriorating relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
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since the first intifada, including the breakdown of the Oslo Peace Process and the policies of 
separation that gave rise to the increasing cycle of violence between the two communities 
(Gordon 2008). In some cases (i.e., Morocco), this decline spans the pre- to post-Arab Spring 
period, while in others (i.e., Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), data are only available in the post-Arab 
Spring period. The decline is quite substantial in some countries. In Egypt, which had the most 
conciliatory position toward Israel, support for Israel even if a two-state solution is reached 
dropped from 35 percent in 2011 to 19 percent in 2013. After Egypt, the country with the highest 
support for recognising Israel was Morocco in 2006, when it stood at 32 percent. However, by 
2011, Moroccan support fell to 24 percent. In Tunisia, support fell from 18 percent in 2011 to 13 
percent in 2013. The survey was conducted one time in Libya in 2011, when only 11 percent 
agreed with recognising Israel. These trends, at least in the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia, are perhaps partially attributable to the rise to positions of power of Islamist parties in 
each of these countries (see Quinn Mecham’s contribution in this special issue). 
[Figure 3] 
The fourth wave of the Arab Barometer, conducted in 2016, obtained higher support for 
recognising Israel, but the question was worded differently from that used in earlier years: “Do 
you support or oppose the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on the establishment of a 
Palestinian State alongside Israel known as the two-state solution?” (see Figure 4). The 
percentage of respondents “supporting” this solution included 25 percent of Algerians, 38 
percent of Moroccans, 46 percent of Egyptians, and 64 percent of Tunisians (the 4th wave of the 
Arab Barometer was not carried out in Libya). Although the difference between the 2016 survey 
responses and those of previous years is potentially due to different wording, one must also 
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consider the possibility that public opinion has shifted more in favor of Israel in the post-Arab 
Spring era. 
 [Figure 4] 
At least (and only) in the case of Egypt, another means of determining North African 
support for relations with Israel during the Arab spring involved asking in 2011 and 2013 
whether Egyptians supported “maintaining” their country’s peace treaty with Israel (see Figure 
5). In 2011, 44 percent “strongly” supported maintaining the treaty, while 30 percent supported 
maintaining, 7 percent did not support, and 15 percent strongly did not support. By 2013, only 25 
percent of Egyptians strongly supported maintaining the treaty, while 45 percent supported 
maintaining, 8 percent did not support, and 10 percent strongly did not support. Although these 
results, if we combine “strongly supported” and “supported,” show some decline in support for 
maintaining the status quo with Israel (from a total of 74 percent in 2011 to 70 percent in 2013), 
overall a strong majority of Egyptians still favoured maintaining the treaty two years after the 
Arab Spring uprisings. This was the case even following the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 
and new elections that resulted in an electoral majority for Islamist parties in both chambers of 
parliament in 2011-2012, as well as the election in 2012 of Mohammed Morsi, the presidential 
candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
[Figure 5] 
A final means for understanding North African support for relations with Israel during 
the Arab Spring involved asking in 2013 questions about economic and security relations with 
Israel. As for the economic dimension, 56 percent of Egyptians, 58 percent of Moroccans, and 82 
percent of Tunisians indicated a preference for decreasing economic ties with Israel (see Figure 
6). Algeria constituted the exception; only 20 percent of Algerians indicated a preference for 
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decreased economic ties, whereas 1 percent favored increased ties and 71 percent favored 
maintaining existing ties. A survey was not carried out in Libya. A similar dynamic emerged 
regarding security ties: 51 percent of Egyptians, 54 percent of Moroccans, and 81 percent of 
Tunisians indicated a preference for decreasing security ties with Israel (see Figure 7). Algeria 
once again constituted the only exception; only 21 percent of Algerians indicated a preference 
for decreased security ties, whereas 1 percent favored increased ties and 69 percent favored 
maintaining existing ties. A survey was not carried out in Libya. Once again, these trends, at 
least in the cases of Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, are perhaps partially attributable to the rise to 
positions of power of Islamist parties in each of these countries (see Quinn Mecham’s 
contribution in this special issue). 
 [Figure 6 and Figure 7]  
Public perceptions of the role of the West, especially the United States 
 
While there is some variation in North African foreign relations with the West, especially the 
United States, all can generally be described as pragmatic – or what Mortimer (2015) refers to as 
national interest pragmatism – particularly during the Arab Spring years. Much of this 
pragmatism is shaped by joint security goals (Gause 2003/2004, 2015; Ryan 2009). Indeed, 
North African states cooperate closely with the U.S. on security matters, and security 
interdependence between the U.S. and many Arab states has increased in the post-cold war 
period (Jamal 2012; see also the article by Schumacher and Schraeder in this special issue). 
Egypt receives substantial U.S. military aid as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 
which was brokered by the U.S. during the Carter administration. Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia 
are allies in the Global War on Terror (Fernández-Molina 2016; Benstead and Reif 2017), and 
since 2013 Tunisia has enjoyed non-NATO ally status (Benstead 2016). Under Qaddafi, Libya 
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and the U.S. had conflictual relations, which led to military skirmishes and U.S. sanctions being 
imposed on Libya beginning in the 1980s (St. John 2011). The U.S. was the largest partner in 
NATO to impose the no-fly zone that allowed rebels in 2011 to overthrow Qaddafi, leaving 
Libyans with strongly pro-American and pro-western sentiments after 2012 (Benstead and 
Boduszynski 2015).4  
North Africans vary in their views of U.S. and Western culture, with positive views more 
common than is recognised in the Western media. This is clearly demonstrated by Waves 1-4 of 
the Arab Barometer which asked the question, “Do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: American and Western culture have positive aspects?” (see Figure 8). Before the Arab 
Spring, there was much more diversity (and fluidity) in reported attitudes toward American 
culture. Yet, with the exception of Egypt, the post-Arab Spring period saw a decline in anti-
Americanism, as measured by positive orientations toward U.S. culture. In Morocco, for 
example, agreement that U.S. culture has positive aspects rose from 60 percent in 2006 to 74 
percent in 2016, while in Algeria, it increased from 52 percent in 2006 to 71 percent in 2016, 
with an intervening drop to 37 percent in 2013. In Tunisia, positive impressions increased from 
61 percent in 2011 to 77 percent in 2016, while in Egypt, it declined slightly from 53 percent to 
48 percent between 2011 and 2016.  
[Figure 8] 
One way of more precisely understanding North African perceptions of the U.S. is to ask 
about specific U.S. policies toward the Arab world. Specifically, Waves 3-4 of the Arab 
Barometer asked the question, “What is the most positive policy that the U.S. can follow in our 
region?” (see Table 4). It is striking that the preferred policy across all five North African 
countries in 2013-14 was one of U.S. non-interference within the Arab world (i.e., “The U.S. 
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shouldn’t interfere”). This ranged from as low of 26 percent of Moroccans to 79 percent of 
Algerians. Moreover, these perceptions changed from 2013 to 2016. In Egypt and Morocco, for 
example, greater numbers of respondents called for U.S. non-interference (31 percent of 
Moroccans and 62 percent of Egyptians). In Algeria and Tunisia, however, decreasing numbers 
of respondents called for U.S. non-interference, thereby suggesting a desire – at least in these 
two countries – for a greater U.S. role within the region. Nevertheless, the opinion that the U.S. 
should not intervene at all was by far the most popular answer among several important foreign 
policy-related responses, including should the U.S. intervene to promote democracy, promote 
economic development, promote women’s rights, or contain Iran. 
One of the most interesting shifts, however, involved the specific policy response as to 
whether the U.S. should attempt to “solve the Arab-Israeli conflict” (see Table 4). There was 
increasing support throughout North Africa from 2013 to 2016 for the U.S. to take on a more 
proactive role in this regard. The proportion supporting this policy increased from 7 to 23 percent 
in Algeria. In Egypt, it remained constant at 15 percent, while in Morocco it increased from 20 to 
27 percent. In Tunisia, the increase was from 7 to 19 percent. This suggests that while sentiments 
among North Africans toward Israel have soured over the course of a decade, this has brought 
with it an increased demand for Western countries to assist with a resolution to the conflict.  
[Table 4] 
Finally, it is also striking to note the degree to which North African publics are willing to 
justify attacks against the United States (e.g., see Tessler and Robbins 2007). This is clearly 
demonstrated by a question, which asked whether North African publics agreed or disagreed 
with the following statement: “The United States’ interference in the region [Arab world] 
justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere” (see Figure 9). Whereas support 
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for militancy increased from 40 percent to 61 percent in Algeria between 2011 and 2013, it 
nonetheless declined in Tunisia from 44 percent to 34 percent during those same years. In 
Morocco and Libya, the question has been asked just once, but a larger proportion of Moroccans 
(49 percent) than Libyans (37 percent) saw these actions as at least somewhat justified (Tessler 
and Robbins 2007).  
[Figure 9] 
Conclusion 
These analyses illustrate the linkages between international and regional affairs and domestic 
public opinion and offer examples of public opinion differentiation (the degree to which there is 
greater variation in public opinion across countries) and diffusion (the degree to which there is 
lesser variation in public opinion across countries) before and after the Arab Spring (Gourevitch 
1978; Bush 2017). Three findings emerge. First, public opinion about domestic and international 
issues are linked in the minds of North African citizens, and foreign policy issues, broadly 
construed, are more important factors underlying the pre- and post-Arab Spring than are often 
recognized by analyses that emphasize domestic issues (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). 
Especially in the post-Arab Spring era, Arab citizens widely see external interference as a 
problem, and this perception increased in every North African country between 2013 and 2016. 
Second, there is considerable variation across and within North African states in attitudes toward 
economic and political foreign policy issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes 
about economic and security relationships with Israel. Anti-Israeli sentiment increased 
substantially in the years leading up to and following the Arab Spring, which also coincided with 
the second intifada. Finally, since the Arab Spring, anti-Americanism, as measured by negative 
perceptions of U.S. culture, has declined in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, but risen slightly in 
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Egypt, even as North Africans demonstrate increased support for a U.S. role in resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict during this same time period. These trends suggest that anti-Americanism is 
highly dependent on specific domestic and international developments, and in any case is highly 
complex, especially in the Arab world (Lynch 2006; Benstead and Reif 2005, 2013; Zoubir and 
Aït-Hamadouche 2006). In sum, analyzing the continuity and change in national- level attitudes 
toward economic and political foreign policy issues in North Africa help inform our 
understanding of both the nuance of public opinion across North Africa, as well as how public 
opinion shaped the foundations and outcomes of the Arab Spring.  
Notes 
1 Libya too held a free and fair election in 2012, but the security vacuum and intensification of 
civil war has undercut representative government. 
2 In classic international relations theory, Waltz (1959, 1975) explained war through three 
images of analysis: the individual, the state, and the international system (i.e., anarchy). 
Gourevitch (1978) expanded on this work by arguing that domestic political structures and 
outcomes are shaped by the international system, in contrast to the second image, which explores 
the ways that international politics are shaped by characteristics of the state, such as capitalism. 
(Bush 2017; see also Bamert, Gilardi, and Wasserfallen 2015; Lynch 2013; Solingen 2012; Bush 
and Prather 2017; Benstead, Kao, and Lust 2017; Corstange and Marinov 2012; Marinov 2013; 
Bush and Jamal 2015). 
3 Due to authoritarianism, none of the major cross-national surveys were conducted before 2011 
in Tunisia and Libya. In Egypt, the World Values Survey was conducted in 2001 and 2008, but 
the Arab Barometer, with its direct relevance to the study of public attitudes toward foreign 
policy, was not conducted in Egypt until after the Arab Spring.  
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4 Ellen Lust, Lindsay Benstead, and collaborators launched the TGP (2017) to study the 
transitional politics of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt.  
5 The Local Governance Performance Index was developed by Benstead, Landry, Lust, and 
Malouche to explain variation in education, health, and municipal service quality and 
transparency. The survey draws large samples of 300 more in each locality, allowing 
comparisons to be made across municipalities (GLD 2017). 
6 Data weighted for all analyses of Waves 2 and 3 of the Arab Barometer. 
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Perception of most important problem facing the country (2006-08) 
(percentage identifying issue as the most important) 
 
 Algeria Morocco 
Internal issues     
Economic situation 51% 56% 
Corruption 31% 27% 
Authoritarianism 8% 4% 
 Algeria Morocco 
External issues     
Ending U.S. occupation in Iraq 1% 1% 
Arab-Israeli conflict 2% 2% 
Other   7% 
Don't know/refuse 8% 4% 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 1. Question not asked in Waves 2-4. 
 
Question wording: “In your opinion which of the following is the most important problem facing 
[respondent’s country] today? Economic situation (poverty, unemployment, inflation); 

























Perceived causes of the Arab Spring (2011) 
(percentage identifying a cause) 
 
  Egypt Tunisia 
Internal issues     
Economic situation 54% 63% 
Civil freedoms 7% 14% 
Prevent Gamal Mubarak from taking power 7%   
Corruption 29% 17% 
Replace Mubarak/Ben Ali 10% 4% 
Social justice 0%  0%  
Price hikes 0% 0% 
External issues     
Pro-Western policy 1% 0% 
Pro-Israeli policy 0% 0% 
Don't know/refuse 1% 2% 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 2. Question not asked in Wave 3. 
 
Question wording: “A number of citizens participated in the protests between 25 January and 11 
February 2011 for various reasons. In your opinion, what was the most important and the second 
most important reason for the protests? Demands for improving the economic situation; 
Demands for civil and political freedoms and liberation from repression; Demands for authority 
not to be passed down to Gamal Mubarak; Combating corruption; Replacing the Mubarak 
regime with an Islamic regime; Objecting to pro-Western Egyptian policy; Objecting to pro-
Israel Egyptian policy.” Tunisia: “A number of citizens participated in the protests between 17 
December 2010 and 14 January 2011 for various reasons. In your opinion, what was the most 
important and the second most important reason for the protests? Demands for improving the 
economic situation; Demands for civil and political freedoms and liberation from repression; 
Combating corruption; Replacing Ben Ali’s regime with an Islamic regime; Objecting to pro-














Perception of external vs. internal sources for the lack of development (2007-16) 
(percentage indicating external vs. internal sources) 
 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 4. 
 
Question wording: “Some people attribute the lack of development in the Arab world compared 
to other parts of the world to external factors, while others blame internal factors. In your 
opinion, which is more important in causing the lack of development in the Arab world? 1. 












Figure 2  
Perception of foreign interference as an obstacle to reform in North Africa (2011-16) 
(percentage agreeing to some or a great extent) 
 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 2-4. Question not asked in Wave 1. 
 
Question wording: “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
Foreign interference is an obstacle to reform in your country. I agree to a great extent; I agree to 

























Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 1-3. 
 
Question wording: “Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion about the 
problem of Israel and Palestine? The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish 
state in the Middle East only when the…; The Arab world should not accept the existence of 


















Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 4. 
 
Question wording: “Do you support or oppose the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on 
the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside Israel known as the two-state solution? 1. 


















Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3. Question not asked in Wave 4. 
 
Question wording: “Do you: Strongly support maintaining the peace treaty with Israel; Support 
maintaining the peace treaty with Israel; Support abolishing the peace treaty with Israel; Strongly 




























Egypt (2011) Egypt (2013)
Strongly support maintaining Support maintaining










Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3. 
 
Question wording: “Do you prefer that future economic relations between your country and 
Israel. Become stronger than they were in previous years; Remain the same as they were in 
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Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3. 
 
Question wording: “Do you prefer that future security relations between your country and Israel. 
Become stronger than they were in previous years; Remain the same as they were in previous 


































Morocco Algeria Tunisia Egypt








Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 1-2 and 4. Question not asked in Wave 3.  
 
Question wording: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: American and 
Western culture have positive aspects. I strongly agree; I disagree.” (Wave 1-2). “Do you agree 
or disagree with the following statement: American and Western culture have positive aspects? 






















Public opinion attitudes regarding desired U.S. policy approach to the Arab world 
(percentage) 
 






















3% 11% 7% 7% 12% 25% 18% 26% 19% 
Contain Iran 1%  1%  2% 3%  0%  
Solve the Arab-
Israeli conflict 7% 23% 15% 15% 11% 20% 27% 7% 19% 
Promote women’s 
rights 1% 8% 1% 2% 1% 5% 4% 1% 3% 
The U.S. should 
not interfere 79% 44% 44% 62% 54% 26% 31% 54% 50% 
Don't  know/refuse 8% 5% 25% 10% 9% 8% 13% 4% 5% 
             
             
Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 3-4. Question not asked in Waves 1-2. 
 
Question wording: “What is the most positive policy that the U.S. can follow in our region? 
Promote democracy; Promote economic development; Contain Iran; Solve the Arab-Israeli 
























Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 2-3. Question not asked in Waves 1 or 4. 
 
Question wording: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States’ 
interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere. I 
strongly agree; I agree; I disagree; I strongly disagree.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
